Chalmers meta problem of consciousness

Chalmers meta problem of consciousness. The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers Feb 15, 2016 · David Chalmers, ‘The hard problem of consciousness’ Excerpts from David Chalmers, ‘The hard problem of consciousness’, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Shiffrin (Norton, 2015). I think that people, even someone as careful as Chalmers, may be tacitly equating the mind-body problem with the problem of consciousness. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. DJ Chalmers. but at the same time it’s the most mysterious phenomenon in the universe. It underlies both the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of causality. the hard problem seems to be a different sort of problem, requiring a different sort of solution. I raise a counterexample to Chalmers’s formulation of the problem. ) In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the connection between consciousness and our verbal and other behavior appears “lucky”. In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Neolithic burial practices appear to express spiritual beliefs and provide early evidence for at least minimally reflective thought about the nature of human consciousness (Pearson 1999, Clark and Riel-Salvatore 2001). 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Recent events, videos, etc. David Chalmers. CHALMERS’ META-PROBLEM 195 ‘problem reports’ (p. Ben White - 2021 - Philosophia 49:495-506. e. J. In this commentary on Chalmers’s work on the meta-problem of consciousness, I defend an approach to the meta-problem that Chalmers finds unpromising (i. Do People Think Consciousness Poses a Hard Problem?: I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that Chalmers, D. Clarendon Press Abstract This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". 11), ‘I can’t see how consciousness could be physi David Chalmers’ framing of the meta-problem of consciousness revolves around the fact that the hard problem of consciousness resonates with so many people, and possible explanations for why this is so. : Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function (Talks@Fermilab, March 2020; also two 2021 versions) The Nature and Ethics of Consciousness (5-hour audio interview with 80,000 hours, October 2019) I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Instead of recognizing David J. “Consciousness” is an ambiguous term that refers to many different phenomena. ” He shares some ways to think about the movie playing in our heads. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. By contrast, the hard problem and the 11 explanatory gap are arguably issues that have been brought to life by The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. Then I develop an alternative formulation. All this brings out one key role for a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness: it can serve as the key premise in a debunking argument for illusionism about consciousness. We suggest that the core of the meta-problem is the seeming 10 arbitrariness of subjective experience. What sets naturalistic dualism apart is its insistence that this dualism isn’t supernatural or beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. Naturally, to develop such a framework would not be easy Oct 16, 2023 · David Chalmers was not expecting the invitation he received in September of last year. 10). Manley, and R. The meta-problem of consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems, but it bears a special relation to the hard problem, which suggests that finding a solution to it could shed light on the hard problem itself. Chalmers describes illusionism (Frankish, 2016) as the view that François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. Chalmers, David (1995) "Facing up to the problem of consciousness". He is perhaps best known for formulating the hard problem of consciousness which could be stated as “why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?” This conversation is part of the Artificial Intelligence podcast. Chalmers' (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. intuitions Apr 3, 2024 · The conclusion that consciousness intuitions are constructed psychologically further underscores the intimate link between the “hard problem” and the problem of explicating the psychological mechanisms that give rise to intuitions (the “meta-problem” (Chalmers 2018)). We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. Chalmers (2018) has recently dubbed this the ‘meta-problem of consciousness'. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. History of the issue. . Nov 20, 2020 · The Hard Problem of Consciousness was originally put forth by Chalmers in Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The easy problems are concerned with the functions and behaviours This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problem typically contrasts Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether intuitions about In 2018, Chalmers highlighted what he calls the "meta-problem of consciousness", another problem related to the hard problem of consciousness: [75] The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. Yet, in contemporary philosophy, and indeed in other disciplines studying consciousness, Chalmers’ presentation seems to hold a special appeal and power in setting up the problem of consciousness. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. g. ’1 According to Chalmers, this is an empirical problem—one concerning the mechanisms that lead people to believe and report that there is a hard problem of consciousness. ). The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165. Chalmers, D. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. 12). reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to 7 Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground 8 between otherwise incompatible positions. François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. This paper is a To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. The Hard Problem of Consciousness. We argue that the materialist should welcome 9 discussion of the meta-problem. Journal of consciousness studies 2 (3), 200-219, 1995. Sep 21, 2018 · The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think and say there is a hard problem of consciousness. 6). We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. net David J. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e. The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. There is not just one problem of consciousness. Author: Chalmers, D. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness' pp. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experien In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. ) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Chalmers introduces the 9 problem intuitions by appeal to the verbal reports that ordinary people 10 make about consciousness. 194–204 David Rosenthal Chalmers’ Meta-Problem Abstract: There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Abstract The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. Chalmers sees between the hard problem and the meta-problem: ‘Whatever explains consciousness (the hard problem) should also play a central role in explaining our judgments about consciousness (the meta-problem)’ (p. Abstract Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. At the start, it is useful to divide the associated problems of consciousness into “hard” and “easy” problems. Neglecting the “meta-problem” can not only obscure the “hard As I see it, the main problem with David Chalmers’ paper ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’ (2018) is that it doesn’t problematize the term ‘consciousness’. François Kammerer) Abstract: The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. 36). Chalmers (2018) sees it as the most plausible reduc-tionist approach to the explanation of consciousness. Rodrigo Díaz - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):55-75. Chalmers begins by asking why ‘physical processing in the brain give[s] rise to a Jan 3, 2021 · In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. (D. ” Against this, I argue that work on the meta-problem will likely fail to make the hard problem any easier. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. This is the paper where I introduced the “hard problem” of consciousness. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem Chalmers famously argues in Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness:. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) Mar 17, 2017 · The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. According to his line of think- Chalmers’ Hard Problem and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. I find it surprising, however, given his previous writings, that Chalmers does not simply attribute these intuitions to the conceptual gap between physical and Currently affiliated with Australian National University and New York University, Department of Philosophy; co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness at NYU. These problem reports contrast with ‘mun- dane reports such as “I am feeling pain now”’ (p. : Oxford University Press (2003) Jan 3, 2021 · In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i. A satisfying solution to the hard problem ought to explain why it seemed like there was a hard problem in the first place Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. 9–10, 2019, pp. I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply. DJ Chalmers, D Manley, R Wasserman. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theo-ries, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”. A solution to the hard problem would involve an account of the relation between physical processes and consciousness, explaining on the basis of natural principles how and why it is that physical processes are associated with states of experience. In a recent paper, David. After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Chalmers examines the meta-problem of consciousness, ‘the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Wasserman, eds. 6-61(56) The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. On Chalmers on the Meta-Problem pp. See full list on consc. It is common to see a paper on consciousness begin with an invocation of the mystery of consciousness, noting the strange intangibility and ineffability of subjectivity, and worrying that so far we have no theory of the phenomenon. that their accumulated psychological material could help explain many aspects of the problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, if approached from the right angle and with an adequate explanatory framework. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. About half of them discuss potential solutions to the meta-problem. J. 2 The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why physical pro-cesses give rise to consciousness. 1. It is literally a “tipping point”; and as an abstraction in itself, it cannot be overstated. From page 3: The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta- Apr 14, 2022 · David Chalmers The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Apr 6, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is a fulcrum concept. Questions about the nature of conscious awareness have likely been asked for as long as there have been humans. In Heil, John, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, pp. David Chalmers famously distinguished the “hard problem” and “easy problems” of consciousness in a 1994 talk given at The The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. The hard problem typic Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995. 3 The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we make the judgments that we do about consciousness, and especially why we judge that consciousness poses a problem. And, if there is no phenomenality, then there is no hard problem of consciousness. (2018) The meta-problem of consciousness, Journal of Conscious-ness Studies, 25 To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. It behooves us to quote him directly to ensure we are on the same page with his characterization. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]] The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. The ambiguity of the term "consciousness" is often exploited by both philosophers and scientists writing on the subject. Each of these phenomena needs to be explained, but some are easier to explain than others. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. I distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem, and I argue that the hard problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 25, Numbers 9-10, 2018, pp. The easy This is the heart of the hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view Feb 27, 2021 · In fact, there are three possible relations between the problem intuitions and phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 2018: 48): meta-problem nihilism or correlationism, which posits no causal relationship between intuitions and phenomenal states; meta-problem realizationism, which claims that phenomenal consciousness is the primary cause of I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the view that explaining the 'problem intuitions' about consciousness is the key to a satisfactory philosophical account of the topic. David J. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Why consciousness is “hard”, however, is uncertain. If In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. (2003) "Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness". Description. Feb 21, 2017 · The idea that consciousness has a different nature to the rest of the world, of course, has a much longer history in philosophy. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Con­sciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down… The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. , what Chalmers has called the “use-mention fallacy” strategy. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). problem but instead to dismiss it by showing that something like phenomenality as described does not exist at all. The mind-body problem bifurcates naturally into an easy discussion of our behavioral apparatus (which may not involve consciousness at all) and a hard discussion about our qualitative experience. Chalmers. Feb 15, 2019 · Call for papers: The Meta-Problem of ConsciousnessThis is a call for papers for a symposium in the Journal of Consciousness Studies on David Chalmers' new paper “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. As a leading authority on consciousness, Chalmers regularly circles the world delivering talks at Chalmers, David. Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem. Jun 18, 2004 · 1. Our consciousness is a fundamental aspect of our existence, says philosopher David Chalmers: “There’s nothing we know about more directly…. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may … Expand Jun 30, 2023 · Chalmers, too, reports plenty of progress, telling Nature that the problem of consciousness “has gradually been transmuting into, if not a ‘scientific’ mystery, at least one that we can get The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips Apr 18, 2016 · David Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and also holds a part-time position at the Australian National University. Chalmers The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and Jan 29, 2020 · David Chalmers is a philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and consciousness. He distinguished between the &ldquo Mar 29, 2022 · The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. David J. More than twenty years ago, David Chalmers published “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology—because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Brian D. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. Aug 11, 2023 · Abstract. Examples Chalmers offers of problem reports include, ‘Consciousness is hard to explain’ (p. 91-98(8) Author: Liu, H. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) David J. Instead, Chalmers suggests that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, much like mass, charge, or space. 173-181(9) Author: Papineau, D. He is well-known for his work in the philosophy of mind, especially for his formulation of the “hard problem” of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26, No. Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is literally the discrete, binary system of rationality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19: reprint: Chalmers, David J. May 22, 2020 · Chalmers (Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem. 194–204 David Rosenthal Chalmers’ Meta-Problem Abstract: There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a problems of consciousness into “hard” and “easy” problems. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods. Do People Think Consciousness Poses a Hard Problem?: Empirical Evidence on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. 1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. Co-director of PhilPapers; co-founded Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness; Former Director, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona. Earp - 2012 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta- In a paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as 'the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem' (Chalmers, 2018, p. May 3, 2022 · In the 1990s, David Chalmers famously distinguished between the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness 164. In this paper Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. By contrast, the hard problem and the 11 explanatory gap are arguably issues that have been brought to life by Jun 24, 2020 · Even granting the parallel to other scientific endeavours, there is something about the hard problem that feels different than other problems. jrifpk yiwho pecrg hnft ndgh eaiqvem llq yhwkwa zsi zkydo